What political turmoil in Somalia means
BY JOEY MICHALAKES

Since the overthrow of dictator Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has experienced a nearly uninterrupted state of armed conflict between militias loyal to a rival local warlords. After fourteen failed attempts at establishing a unified, sovereign national government, Somalia’s reputation as a “failed state” also makes it a highly desirable haven for foreign terrorists. Acutely aware of this disturbing possibility, the United States has made the continued pursuit of al-Qaeda operatives the centerpiece of its foreign policy in the region.

Yet Somalia deserves attention for humanitarian as well as strategic reasons. Its people suffer through both constant warfare and an absence of domestic institutions capable of providing even the most basic levels of stability, infrastructure, or life necessities. With the international community increasingly concerned about Somalia’s humanitarian plight as well as its geopolitical significance, reaching a workable, nationwide political solution has become a key aim for all actors involved.

The primary sources of division within Somalia are neither ethnic nor sectarian interests, but rather clan-based ones. As David Smock of the United States Institute of Peace explained in an interview with HPR, “Even though Somalis speak the same language, share the same culture, and share the same religion, the clan structure is very divisive.” Without a strong central government, different regions of Somalia fall under the jurisdiction of various tribes and local clan leaders. The central and southern regions — which include the capital, Mogadishu — suffer from a political climate in which cooperation rarely extends beyond the most immediate subunits of one’s own clan. In an interview with HPR, James Bishop, the United States’ last ambassador to Somalia, explained that there is “competition for water, pasturage, and… cattle. It is a competition that used to be fought out with arrows and sabers… Now it is fought out with AK-47s.”

The violence showed its first signs of abatement last summer, when a coalition known as the Islamic Courts Union seized control of much of the southern half of the country and instituted Shari’a law. Since Shari’a has historically held only a limited place in the religious and judicial customs of Somalis, the sweeping form imposed by the ICU was largely unprecedented. The ICU banned alcohol and the hallucinogen khat, shut down local cinemas, prohibited music on local radio stations and even went so far as to have people shot for demanding to watch World Cup soccer. Mogadishu also saw a dramatic upswing in public executions under ICU rule, including one shocking case in which a 16-year old boy was authorized to publicly stab his father’s killer in the throat. Yet as Bishop explained, the ICU had a decidedly positive impact on the area’s security situation: “One of my regrets as a humanitarian is that the Islamic Courts had brought an unprecedented level of stability to Mogadishu.” Ultimately, though, the Islamic coalition’s rapid campaign of military expansion worried neighboring Ethiopia, which eventually invaded Somalia in December 2006 and wiped out the ICU as a functional military and political entity.

The political situation inherited by the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government remains chaotic. The organization itself is mired in internal conflict after the arrest of the Supreme Court president and firing of the attorney general. Radical remnants of the ICU — namely the extremist, al-Qaeda trained al-Shabbab Militia — have engaged in terrorist attacks and skirmishes with Ethiopian soldiers over the past nine months, killing thousands. Even more pressingly, Somalia faces a deepening humanitarian crisis. As Kuwait University professor Ghanim al-Najjar, the UN’s independent human rights expert in Somalia, told the HPR, “There are over 700,000 internally displaced people…Humanitarian assistance brought by international agencies is often pirated. All kinds of basic services do not exist.”

International actors are increasingly worried that Somalia’s local problems could wreak havoc on a much larger scale. Continued conflict in Somalia could lead to a kind of proxy competition between enemy governments in nearby Ethiopia and Eritrea. Recently, the Eritrean capital of Asmara became host to a political party calling itself the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia, composed mostly of ex-ICU members. Explained al-Najjar: “There will have to be a linkage between the Ethiopian-Eritrean feud and the future of Somalia.” Of greater concern is the potential that Somalia may currently or someday harbor al-Qaeda militants. The State Department believes that several senior al-Qaeda members implicated in the 1998 embassy bombings might be operating in Somalia, including Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, one of the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists. While Bishop emphasized that Somalia’s political unrest has neither meaningfully destabilized neighboring countries nor turned Somalia into an established terrorist training ground, the international community seems unwilling to let the scenario of a perpetual power vacuum in Somalia continue to play itself out.

The way forward in Somalia poses a dilemma for policymakers, as it calls for the simultaneous reconstruction of so many facets of society: political institutions, social order, economic stability, and basic humanitarian needs. To some, the United States’ focus on global terrorism seems to distract from the broader mission of nation-building, and has kept it from getting involved more actively in solving Somalia’s problems. Al-Najjar argues, “The United States’ policy is confused rather than proactive…The UN has a very good plan for the reconstruction of Somalia. It needs political and economic support.” The UN’s agenda involves the construction of transportation and infrastructure across all regions of the country in an effort to stimulate economic growth. The international community must also find a way to replace Ethiopian troops, whom Somalis have long resented for reasons dating back to Cold War-era territorial struggles, with an international peacekeeping force. Meanwhile, the Transitional Federal Government is in the process of drafting a constitution in the hope that parliamentary elections may be completed by 2009.

The role that remnants of the ICU may play in this process is unclear, but even the United States has left the door open for the inclusion of certain opposition elements, provided they renounce violence. As Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs James Swan remarked publicly this past September: “While there are genuine opposition voices that should be brought into the political process, we must emphasize that violence is not acceptable as a means of achieving political objectives.” Indeed, without an end to violence, achieving the ambitious political and economic goals laid out by the UN and by Somalia’s Transitional Federal Charter would likely prove impossible. Ultimately, the hope is that a more stable political environment will help bring closure Somalia’s seemingly intractable national crisis.¨ ]]>